Abstract-Homogeneous wireless sensor networks (HWSNs) are a class of WSNs in which nodes have identical hardware configurations. A HWSN inherits the same constraints from WSNs such as limited processing capacity and resources. However, the unique characteristic of HWSNs gets more attention for recent security applications. The environment of these applications mandates lightweight security provisions, especially a key management protocol that endures security threats such as node capture attack. On the other hand, the limited computation and communication capabilities of sensor nodes make it hard to deal with such security threats. Thus, in this paper, we introduce a novel clustering paradigm to be used in a key pre-distribution key management scheme designed for HWSNs. Then, we develop a cluster-based key pre-distribution based on this paradigm. Our developed scheme improves the security dramatically by partitioning sensor nodes to the disjointed clusters and letting clusters to be inter-connected via randomly selected nodes as consular nodes from all the clusters to form a universal cluster. As opposed to the adopted schemes, we provide a comprehensive analysis for both sensor node connectivity, and resiliency against node capture attack, and also computational results are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
A homogenous wireless sensor network (HWSN) is a special type of wireless sensor network (WSN) where sensor nodes have an identical hardware (and there is no heterogeneous node). HWSNs target wide range of applications such as military tasks and critical environment surveillance. Sensor nodes are resource limited and rely on intermittent wireless communication. In such network, nodes sense and report events to the base station which it monitors and coordinates the sensing nodes accordingly.
In mission critical applications, sensor nodes are deployed in hostile areas where communication might be intercepted and sensor nodes are subject to capture and impersonation by an adversary. In these situations, security services become tremendously essential to safe guard the communication between sensors and the base station. Among these security services, key management is known as the most vital element. Due to the importance of key management, a variety of key management schemes have been proposed [1] - [5] . Since wireless sensor nodes are resource constrained (e.g. 4 MHz 8-bit CPU), traditional key management techniques using public key infrastructure (PKI) may not be appropriate for a HWSN. It is due to excessive energy consumption and hardware requirements of the PKI. Centralized key management techniques also may not be suitable for HWSNs. Centralized architecture limits the scalability of network and leaves a single point of compromising for entire of the network.
Considering aforementioned discussion, pre-distributing the symmetric keys among the sensors in the network is a practical solution. A very first approach using key pre-distribution scheme (KPS) is to employ a single mission key for the entire network nodes to secure their communication traffic. The main drawback to this approach is that, compromising of only one key in the network put the network in risk of information leakage. The second approach is to generate a unique key for each node in the network of size n and load each node with n − 1 keys belong to other sensor nodes. Obviously, this scheme is not memory efficient and the rekeying mechanism will be very hard to apply to this scheme. Therefore, Eschenauer et al. [6] proposed the first random key pre-distribution scheme (aka. Basic scheme) that relies on probability of key sharing among the nodes of a random graph. In this method, each sensor node receives a set of keys from a large key pool before deployment. Two nodes can initiate a secure link if they find a key in common. Chan et al. [7] improved the basic scheme random pair-wise key by proposing a pre-distribution key management (aka. qcomposite scheme) that requires two nodes to share at least q number of keys to setup a secure communication. Their scheme improves the security of basic approach by providing more resilience against node capture attack. However both the basic and q-composite schemes assume no deployment information prior to node placement (e.g. node location), and nodes are assumed randomly positioned in network. Consequently, some works utilized deployment knowledge to improve the security. Such schemes [8] - [16] improve sensor network memory efficiency, and resilience against node capture attack by avoiding unnecessary key assignments to nodes. Unfortunately, pre-deployment information is not guaranteed to be available in some scenarios. There are schemes that let the key materials (information about keys and key generators) be pre-loaded into sensor nodes instead of the actual keys [9] , [10] , [13] , [16] - [25] . In these schemes, there are unwanted computation overheads due to the key generation and establishment, which make it difficult to utilize them in some deployments.
A. Outline of our proposed clustering paradigm
Considering the aforementioned schemes, improving the security and performance of [6] , [7] is still an open problem. The proposed solutions are based on utilizing pre-distribution of key generators, pre-deployment knowledge, or heterogeneous nodes. Unfortunately, none of these solutions can be applied for a situation where there is no deployment knowledge, and heterogeneous nodes are not available. Additionally, key generation at the nodes after deployment is energy consuming. Therefore, we propose a novel clustering method to develop a random key pre-distribution scheme for HWSNs based on [6] , [7] . In our design, sensor nodes are randomly distributed in every location of network and clustered into groups. Size and number of groups (clusters) are customized by user application before node deployment. For each one of the clusters, a distinct key pool is generated in such a way that there is no overlap between key pools of any two clusters. Cluster formation is only based on the type of pre-loaded keys in sensor nodes. Cluster formation and key establishment are accomplished with zero knowledge about node deployment. We assume all nodes have identical physical characteristics (HWSN). It means that sensor nodes have the same capacity of processing and communication, but they might have different data aggregation or sensing target. On top of all these clusters, we build another cluster that is called universal cluster. Members of this cluster are consular nodes. These consular nodes are randomly chosen from all the other clusters by user application, in an offline process. Therefore, a consular node belongs to two clusters. This universal cluster provides a way for two clusters to exchange some limited information such as security control messages. The type and amount of information exchange can be defined under the application policies. Clusters isolate security threats from within and deal with the security problem locally. For each cluster (including universal cluster), we run a totally separated key distribution. Each cluster can be granted with different security privileges which provide a hierarchical security mechanism. A sensor node can operate in every region of the network (regardless of its geographic location) and communicate with those that are from its own cluster. Of course two communicating nodes should be within the communication range of each other, therefore, a certain node density should be provided to avoid node isolation. To address this issue [6] , [7] have made an assumption in which the average number of neighboring nodes is given. Here, we made an almost similar assumption for the network where for each cluster this number is provided. As it is shown in Fig. 1 as long as two adjacent nodes belong to a similar cluster they may establish a secure intra-cluster communication, and similarly any two neighbor consular nodes may establish a secure intercluster links. 
B. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as following:
1) We propose a novel clustering paradigm to be used in HWSNs, and develop a key pre-distribution key management scheme based on this paradigm. 2) We illustrate that resulting key pre-distribution scheme based on our paradigm significantly improves resilience against node capture, and scalability of a HWSN.
C. Related works
Proposing a solution to improve security capacity of [6] , [7] has been an interesting research topic in key management for last few years.
Liu and Ning [19] extended work at [17] and adopted key pre-distribution schemes [6] , [7] . Unfortunately, this approach still suffers from impact of node capture attack to a certain threshold. Similarly, Du et al. [9] improved the resiliency of [18] by adopting scheme at [6] . Beside the better resilience of this design as compared to [18] , there still exists performance issues such as higher storage requirement, communication overhead, and lower local connectivity for this scheme.
Some schemes improved efficiency by applying deployment knowledge. Liu and Ning [20] enhanced the scalability and connectivity of [7] by adding location information. In the same work, authors proposed to combine their approach with [17] that results in higher connectivity and less communication overhead.
Clustering is another approach to improve security, scalability, and flexibility by dividing network to clusters [26] . Du et al. [8] adapted the basic scheme [6] by combining it with deployment knowledge to propose a group-based deployment scheme. This scheme is more memory efficient and offer less communication overhead as well as a better resilience. Since it uses deployment knowledge as an enhancement mechanism, is not flexible for varieties of applications. With the similar approach, the hexagonal group-based key management [14] combined [17] with deployment knowledge, and later this work improved at [23] . In [13] , Liu et al. introduced a groupbased deployment scheme. This general framework is compatible with most of mentioned schemes as its underlying solution and improves their security and performance. This framework allows efficient scalability for those key management schemes that do not scale well. Also, it avoids unnecessary communication overhead.
There are cluster based key managements where the clusterheads are considered to be more powerful than the other nodes (aka. heterogeneous key management). In these heterogeneous schemes, occasionally cluster-heads carry out special duties in key establishments and therefore they need to be provided with stronger hardware spec. Lu et al. [10] proposed a unified framework for distributed key management schemes in heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. This framework highly relies on employing heterogeneous nodes as the main element to improve security and performance. Proposing a solution to improve security capacity of [6] and [7] has been an interesting research topic in key management. Chan et al. [11] proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme based on [6] , [7] and using knowledge of deployment of sensor nodes for different regions of network. Their scheme clusters the network to different regions to provide better scalability and security. This approach suggests good performance while increasing resilience to the attacks for the sensor cluster, compared to those prior schemes. The main disadvantage with heterogeneous schemes is that, they are not flexible with most of network topologies and applications [2] , [5] , [26] . It is hard to suppose, cluster-heads are fully connected and also secure against attacker, as it is assumed in some heterogeneous schemes [27] - [29] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews the developed scheme based on our proposed novel clustering paradigm. We analyze and evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in Section III. Finally in Section IV, we summarize our findings.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHEME
In this section, we describe our new key management design, which relies on probabilistic key sharing among the cluster nodes of a random graph. It uses straightforward protocols for shared-key discovery and path-key establishment, and for key revocation, re-keying, and incremental addition of nodes. Table I explains some of the notations used in this paper.
A. Key distribution
Similar to [6] and [7] , key distribution in our scheme consists of three phases that are: key pre-distribution, sharedkey discovery, and path-key establishment. 
Number of nodes, Average number of neighboring nodes of a nodes in i th cluster, Number of nodes in the network
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Least number of required common keys for two consular nodes in order to establish a pair-wise key, Number of common keys for two consular nodes Kc i ,Ḱc i A cluster key, A new cluster key for i th cluster
A master key for a node, A master key for a consular node Kpw A pair-wise key of two nodes α Catalog of stored keys in the sensor node
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Pc, P
Global connectivity of a cluster (or a network comprising of a cluster), Global connectivity for i th cluster, Global connectivity for the universal cluster, Global connectivity for the entire of the network
Local connectivity (the probability of existence of a link between two nodes), Local connectivity for i th cluster, Local connectivity for the universal cluster
Number of captured nodes, Number of captured nodes in i th cluster, Number of captured nodes in universal cluster 1) Key pre-distribution phase: Prior to deployment of sensor nodes in operation field, a key pre-distribution phase is performed. The key pre-distribution phase includes following steps:
• Generation of a large key pool S i , and associated key identifiers for each of i th cluster.
• Random selection of m i keys out of corresponding key pool S i without replacement, to form the key ring of each sensor node belonging to i th cluster.
• Generation of a large universal key pool U and associated key identifiers.
• Random selection of y i nodes from each cluster members of i th cluster to be assigned as the consular nodes.
• Random selection of l keys out of key pool U without replacement to form the key ring of each consular node. The number of keys in the key pools S i and U is chosen such that each two random subsets of size m i in S i and l in U will share at least one key with some probability.
• Generation of a unique cluster-key K ci for each cluster (including universal cluster).
• Loading related cluster keys and key rings into the memory of each sensor node; saving of the key identifiers of key rings and associated sensor identifier on the base station; and loading each node with a unique master key that computed as
2) Shared-key discovery phase: In the shared-key discovery phase, each node tries to discover all common keys with each of its immediate neighbors. Basically, any two neighboring nodes must find out whether they are from the same cluster. This can be accomplished by exchanging an encrypted hello message via cluster-key between any two sensor nodes. Similarly, any consular node uses its universal cluster-key to locate other bi-cluster nodes. If any of two nodes acknowledges its adjacent node, then they can continue to send the list of key identifiers associated with their key rings. An encrypted catalog of sensor's stored keys Enc α; K ci is broadcasted to all the immediate cluster nodes. Then, each node examines received identifier list with its own catalog to find the common keys. If the number of common keys equals toq where q <q (orλ for any two consular nodes, where λ <λ), then they hash all theq (orλ) keys to compute their pair-wise key as such
. Therefore, every time any two sensor nodes want to establish a secure link, they encrypt their traffic via their pair-wise shared key.
3) Path-key establishment phase: After shared-key discovery phase, in each cluster there are some nodes that could not establish a pair-wise key and they are still within the communication range of each other. In this situation, intracluster connection would not be ideal for some applications that need high network connectivity. Therefore by establishing path-keys, we can enforce the network graph to provide more secure links, and consequently more network connectivity will be delivered. To establish a path-key for any two adjacent sensor nodes, no new keys will be generated via sensor nodes. Simply, sensor nodes utilize their unassigned keys from their key rings. Note that, for any two nodes that desire to establish a path-key, there should be a path between the source and destination nodes via some intermediate nodes to let the pathkey procedures take place. Path-key establishment can be done via more secure mechanism that is introduced by Ling and Znati [30] ; however, applying this scheme incurs extra routing overhead and not well suited for highly mobile sensor nodes.
B. Key revocation
Whenever a sensor node is compromised, it is essential to be able to revoke the entire key ring of that node. Response of our scheme to a compromised node is varied based on type of node participation since the base station knows the key ring and cluster of revoking node.
1) Intra-cluster revocation: Where the compromised node is not a consular node, the base station identifies the corresponding consular nodes of the revoking node. Then, it sends an encrypted message to each of consular nodes using related master key K key identifiers LS, for the key ring to be revoked, and a new cluster key appended with message authentication code (MAC) that is produced via Kć i . Meanwhile, base station sends a unicast encrypted message (with corresponding node master key) containing of the Kć i to every single cluster member of revoking node (excluding the compromised node) tagged with correct MAC. Once a consular node verifies the revocation message, sends encrypted acknowledge to the base station via Kć i , immediately after it deletes all its keys that match with revoked key ring, and then it generates and broadcasts an encrypted message for cluster members (via Kć i ) to revoke the compromised node. Cluster members leave no chance to establish a secure connection with the revoking node by deleting their common keys with LS. Intra-cluster revocation mechanism assures a list of key identifiers of the compromised node and a new cluster key are securely delivered to each cluster node, absolutely hidden to compromised node. Nodes can also authenticate the revocation message coming from consular node since this message is encrypted with a new cluster key that only shared by base station, consular node and each cluster node.
2) Consular node revocation: When a consular node is compromised, the base station has to work with all the other consular nodes to complete the revocation process. The base station has to make sure both the universal cluster and targeting cluster members (which their consular node was compromised) delete the possible revealed keys from their key rings. So that, the base station sends an encrypted message using related K yi σ to all the members of the universal cluster. This message contains a LS, and a Kć i appended with message authentication code (MAC) that is produced via Kć i . Consular nodes remove the matched keys with the revoked key ring, and then acknowledge the base station security (with Kć i ). In this situation, there are Y − 1 consular nodes remained for the targeting cluster (that its consular node was just revoked within the universal cluster). Thus, the base station and these consular nodes execute an intra-cluster revocation procedure accordingly.
By the end of revocation process, all the possible secure links to compromised node are removed. In this process, some of the possible security links (those links that are established or might possibly be established) are destroyed. Therefore, involved nodes need to reestablish the shared-key discovery and, possibly path-key establishment, to recover those failed links.
C. Re-Keying
Key-freshness is one of the major requirements for a key management system. Key-freshness defines a lifetime for a key, and if the keys are expired then protocol should update them accordingly. The base station enforces a mechanism to establish re-keying procedures once a key needs to be updated. As it was mentioned in previous section, the revocation process also demands having a re-keying mechanism. The re-keying mechanism could be either event-driven or periodical. Since our scheme is a pre-distribution one, it uses an event-driven key update (path-key establishment technique) to provide new secure links between disjoint nodes (recall that, once a key is revoked some links might go off-line). The only online rekeying mechanism is to provide cluster keys to nodes (and possibly related consular nodes). Our scheme does not provide any periodical key update for sensor nodes. Therefore, if any two securely connected nodes want to update their expired keys, they simply run a random selection of a key K r from their common keys, and then hash their pair-wise key with that preferred key to produce a fresh pair-wise key (H[K r K pw ]).
III. ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the capacity and functionality of our scheme in variety of aspects. We provide a comprehensive analytic discourse to clarify the connectivity of secure links in network graph, required and supportable key pool and ring size for nodes and clusters, and network resilience against node capture attack.
A. HWSNs connectivity with random graphs
Intermittent connection in wireless sensor network is one issue that impacts the overall performance of key management protocol. Any two remote nodes establish a secure link if all the intermediate nodes establish required secure links. Any two nodes can establish a direct secure link when they are within the range of each other and share adequate number of keys based on the protocol requirement. Thus, before explaining the probability of having connected network graph, we have to discuss the probability of sharing the right number of keys between two nodes. As it is described in the fundamental random pair-wise key schemes, Erdös and Renyi's random graph theory [31] explains the relationship between the local connectivity and the global connectivity. More specifically, considering asymptotic statistical properties for a very large random graph G n of n nodes, the probability of desired global connectivity is given by P c = lim
, where P (G n ) denotes the probability of G n being completely connected and c is an arbitrary fixed real number.
Thus, the degree of a node d in a random graph of n nodes (the number of established links to other nodes) can be verified as, d = P n × (n − 1) and d = 2Nc n . Therefore, we have N c = n 2 log n + cn, where N c is the total number of links (connections) between nodes in a random graph.
This implies,
(1) and Fig. 2 illustrate the relationship between P n and P c . Therefore, for a given n and a desired P c , the required P n can be computed. For instance, given desired P c = 0.99999 and network size of n = 600 nodes, we need to provide P n = 0.0299. Also, the curves in Fig. 2 are almost flat when n is large, which indicates that the size of the network has little impact on the required P n to let the network graph stays connected. Relationship between desired global connectivity Pc and local connectivity Pn with regard to n.
Global network connectivity P G , is influenced by the P c . Therefore, for a network consists of C clusters,
c . Let us denote P nc are small, with a good approximation we have,
Therefore, when a network with global connectivity of P c is divided to C clusters, each cluster should increase its global connectivity.
B. Key pool and ring size calculation
To produce a key pool per cluster and key ring for each node, we should find the right values for size of them. We can calculate these values, from the average number of neighborhood for cluster nodesń (as one of the connectivity constraints imposed by wireless communication) and (1) . Indeed, the number of neighborhoods limited toń n nodes, and obviously the probability of direct connection between two nodes in neighborhood will be Pń P n . Since n i andń i are given, and Pń i = P ni ( ní ni ) P ni , the probability of secure direct connection for any two nodes belonging to the i th cluster is calculated as,
Depending on hardware platform of sensor nodes, the maximum allowable size of the key ring m i can be defined, and this value is an input to find the minimum value for key pool size S i . Combination of (1) and (3) leads to
Since we have the knowledge ofÝ neighboring node density and Y number universal cluster members (all the consular nodes), and P (u) c desired network connectivity of the universal cluster. Then, with the same analysis we can compute the key ring l and pool U for the universal cluster by
C. Resiliency to sensor node capture
In this section, the resilience of our proposed key management scheme against node capture attack is evaluated. Once a node is captured, the attacker tries to recover all the keys in the captured sensor node to decrypt the possible encrypted traffic among the other nodes. It is possible that some links can be tapped via the same recovered keys. Therefore, we want to know what fraction of secure connections can be compromised if x number of nodes are captured. We start our analysis by answering the following question. When γ − 1 nodes are captured and b keys have been discovered by the attacker, if one more node is captured, what is the probability of a keys becoming known to the attacker, where a ≥ b. Lemma 1 answers this question. 
T γ represents the set of keys discovered to attacker by successfully capturing γ nodes. We consider the worst case scenario where the entire key ring of a node is discovered to attacker, once it is captured. Since
Note that, a−b keys are chosen from S i − b remaining keys that were not in key rings of γ − 1 captured nodes, there are also m i − a + b keys are common among R γ and T γ−1 . Therefore (6) is valid.
Suppose x i and x u represent the number of captured nodes in i th cluster and the number of captured nodes in universal cluster, respectively. Note that, when γ nodes are captured a could not be greater than min(S i , γm i ), and b could not be greater than a. On the other hand, where γ ≤ m i + 1 then a could be as small as m i + 1; however, if γ > m i + 1 then a may be as small as γ. The lower bound for b can be derived the same as the lower bound for a by considering the fact that |T 1 | = m i . Consequently, let us define upper and lower bound values for a and b as a min max(m i + 1, γ), a max min(S i , γm i ), b min max(m i +min(γ −2, 1), γ −1, a−m i ), and b max a. Then from (6) we drive probability of a keys are discovered by attacker when γ ≥ 2 nodes are captured as
for a min ≤ a ≤ a max , otherwise Pr(|T γ | = a) = 0 for any other values of a.
From (6) and (7) we have
Let us define ζ i min(x, n i ), ξ i max(x, n i ), and N = C i=1 n i . Then, P xi denotes the expected fraction of total keys compromised for the i th cluster, that is
Similarly, we define ζ u min(x, y) and ξ u max(x, y). Then P xu denotes the expected fraction of total keys compromised for universal cluster, that is
As we discussed in II-A2, any two nodes may produce a unique pair-wise key to form a secure link when they sharé q ≥ q (orλ ≥ λ) keys. Therefore, this communication link becomes compromised when exactlyq (orλ) keys found among all the keys revealed from x captured nodes by adversary. Hence, when x nodes are captured, the probability that a link between any two nodes within i th cluster have been compromised is
Probability of link compromise for universal cluster P (u) L can be calculated by replacing x i with x u ,q withλ, and m i with l in (11) accordingly. Consider, ni 2 the total number of possible secure links for any two nodes for i th cluster, and y i y j total number of secure links for any two consular nodes from i th and j th clusters (where i = j), therefore, from (11), the probability of successful cracking of any secure link in the entire network by attacker when x nodes are captured is given by
We define the resiliency R (i)
L for i th cluster as,
This probability represents the durability of a link in a cluster against node capture attack after x i nodes were compromised out of n i cluster nodes. In other words, it is the fraction of compromised links over the total number of links for a cluster when x i nodes are captured. The resiliency for any two nodes (from the same cluster) in the entire network will be, R L = 1 − P L .
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct experiments and plot our results to evaluate a security aspect of our developed scheme in term of resilience against node capture attack.
Suppose that the attacker randomly or selectively captures a node and tries to recover all the keys from the node (we assume all the keys were successfully discovered by attacker) and then tries to use these keys to intercept the secure communication between any two randomly chosen communicating nodes in the network. A successful attack is when the attacker manages to crack the intercepted data from un-captured nodes via discovered keys. Fig. 3 demonstrates the probability of successful node capture attack versus the number of captured nodes for a network of n = 600, Y = 60 and C = 1, 4, 6 (see Table II ). As it is shown in the figure, our scheme is more sustainable when there is a node capture attack as compared to [6] , [7] . The reason is, in [6] , [7] when an adversary tries to capture nodes from a region of the network, all nodes are associated with one key pool whereas in our scheme nodes may belong to different key pools. It can be observed that increasing the values of q and λ increases the resilience slightly. On the other hand, increasing the number of clusters leads to a better resilience. Fig. 3 and a comparison of the local and global connectivity given in Table II show a tradeoff between the global connectivity and the resilience. For instance, when C = 6 (we partition the network into 6 clusters), q = 1 and λ = 1, the resiliency is improved as compare to when C = 1, and local and global connectivity level drop (local connectivity is decreased from 0.9999 to 0.092066). The reason is,ń i is decreased for each cluster when the number of clusters is increased.
It is possible that a portion of key pool never be assigned to any current node in the network. It is likely when the size of key pool is relatively large in compare to the number of nodes in the network. In this situation, even if all the nodes are captured, it is not guaranteed that all the keys (key pool) have become available to an adversary. Consequently, future deployments of nodes might be able to establish secure links using unassigned keys from key pool. Hence, for C = 4, 6 when x = n i , the probability of successful attack is not equal to 1. In some scenarios a certain level of global connectivity is desired, therefore a certain level of required local connectivity should be satisfied as it is discussed in Section III-B. Fig.  4 compares the probability of successful node capture attack under different scenarios that the related system parameters can be found at Table III . For example, when we increase the number of nodes from n = 600 to n = 2400, we need to increase the key pool size from 1000 to 4000 to increase the resiliency. Unfortunately, increasing the key pool size may result in lower connectivity. More specifically, moving from (a-1) to (a-2) the local connectivity will drop significantly, if we use [6] . Instead, our scheme increases the resiliency while maintaining the similar level of local connectivity, (in Fig.Fig. 4 . The probability of successful attack against number of captured nodes x for different configurations (see Table III for system parameters used).
better) resilience for (a-2) with smaller key pool per cluster. In such situation, the local connectivity for each cluster is enhanced (in Fig. 4 and Table III compare (a-2) with (c-1)).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a clustering paradigm to be used in a random key pre-distribution scheme for homogeneous wireless sensor networks. We developed a key pre-distribution scheme based on this paradigm. The resulting scheme isolates the effect of node compromise into one specific cluster in which resiliency of the entire network significantly improved against node capture attack. Also, our scheme provides scalability for both node and cluster addition. Our design enables inter-cluster communication (under a specific assumption) by applying universal cluster that is composed of randomly chosen consular nodes from each cluster, and that comes with nominal memory overhead. In this work, we draw an inclusive security analysis that can lead to better understanding about previous works. Our computational results prove a considerable security improvement as opposed to similar prior schemes.
In our future work, we will investigate a mobile connectivity model to verify the possibility of the proposed scheme for mobile wireless sensor networks. Also, the communication cost analysis could be a valuable metric to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. 
